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Abstract
We document a robust buy/sell asymmetry in the choice of the broker in the IPO aftermarket:
institutional investors are less likely to sell than buy through the lead underwriters. Consistent
with investors hiding their sell trades, the asymmetry is the strongest in cold IPOs and it is
limited exclusively to the first month after the issue. Contrary to the conventional view, the
intention to flip IPO allocations is not an important motive for hiding sell trades from the
lead underwriters; institutions that sell shares through non-lead brokers tend to have bought
them through the lead underwriters in the IPO aftermarket, consistent with institutions
breaking their laddering agreements. We find that hiding sell trades is an effective strategy to
circumvent underwriters’ monitoring mechanisms: the more institutions hide their sell trades,
the less they are penalized in subsequent IPO allocations.
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1. Introduction
Despite considerable research on the conflicts of interest in initial public offerings,
there is little evidence describing moral hazard problems faced by IPO investors. This
topic deserves attention because investors’ behavior may ultimately affect the benefits
and the costs of the book-building method. In particular, we are interested if the IPO
mechanism in place motivates the choice of the broker(s) to which investors direct their
trades in the IPO aftermarket. We hypothesize that the IPO bookbuilding method
provides incentives to investors to avoid lead underwriters for their sell trades in the
IPO stocks in the early aftermarket.
Institutional investors may have an incentive to hide their sell trades from the lead
underwriters in the IPO aftermarket (we call it “hide-and-sell” hypothesis) for two main
reasons. First, investors might try to hide their allocations sales in order to preserve
their business and relationship with the lead underwriters in the IPO allocations market.
A key feature of book-built IPOs is that the investment banks that underwrite the issue
have considerable discretion over who receives allocations. As explained by Jenkinson
and Jones (2004), one of the popular justifications for such discretion, often emphasized
by investment bankers, is that underwriters can allocate shares to long-term holders of
the stock in the interests of the issuer. Investors that readily sell their allocations in the
IPO aftermarket, commonly referred to as “flippers”, tend to put a downward pressure
on the trading price. While this might not be a relevant concern in hot IPOs, where
flipping may serve to increase market liquidity, the selling pressure generated by flippers
could lower the price below the offer price in cold offerings (see Aggarwal (2003)).
Underwriters may find it convenient to reward institutions that play a supportive role
and do not flip their allocations, as they play a role as market makers in the secondary
market (Ellis et al. (2000)), and they may face reputational losses in case of poor
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aftermarket performance and too much flipping activity (Aggarwal (2003)). Consistent
with this view, Chemmanur et al. (2010) find that investors receive larger allocations
when they hold their allocations for longer periods. This gives investors an incentive
to hide their allocation sales from the lead underwriters. We label this incentive as the
“allocation sales explanation”. Some existing studies suggest that investors may try to
hide their allocation sales in post-IPO trading (Griffin et al. (2007), Chemmanur et al.
(2010)).
The second reason for hiding sell trades from the lead underwriters is related to
the practice known as “laddering”, which involves a quid-pro-quo arrangement between
underwriters and their clients: investors receive IPO allocations in exchange for a com-
mitment to purchase additional shares in the aftermarket. The clients that enter such an
agreement are called “ladderers”. As explained by Hao (2007) and Griffin et al. (2007),
laddering could be beneficial for the lead underwriters as the buying pressure from
ladderers could reduce the underwriters’ price support costs in the IPO aftermarket,
especially in cold IPOs. Moreover, the pre-arranged client demand in the aftermarket
may increase underwriters’ brokerage commission revenues. The Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) considers laddering as a manipulative practice prohibited
by Rule 101 of Regulation M under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. However, the
legal definition of laddering requires the aftermarket purchase to be a condition imposed
by the underwriter, thus leaving some space for implicit quid-pro-quo arrangements in
which investors volunteers to buy additional shares (Hao (2007)). Consistent with lead
underwriters engaging in laddering agreements with their clients, Griffin et al. (2007)
find that investors are net buyers through the lead underwriters in a sample of Nasdaq
IPOs. We posit that ladderers may have an incentive to break their quid-pro-quo ar-
rangements if the shares that they committed to buy in the secondary market are in
excess of their optimal holdings in the IPO firm. The potential costs for the investors
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that break the agreement, in terms of future business with the underwriters, may in-
centivize them to hide their sell trades. We label the incentive to hide sell trades that
break investors’ laddering agreements with the lead underwriters as “laddering expla-
nation”. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to document that laddering
mechanism may provide an incentive for the investor to avoid the underwriting brokers
when selling the IPO stock in the aftermarket.
The hiding strategy that we consider in this paper is to sell IPO shares through
brokers other than the lead underwriters (henceforth, “non-lead brokers”). We motivate
our focus on this hiding strategy because of its simplicity of execution, as institutional
investors usually trade through more than one brokerage house (Goldstein et al. (2009)).
If the hide-and-sell hypothesis holds, and investors use this simple hiding strategy, then
we should observe them to be less likely to trade through the lead underwriters when
they sell, than when they purchase shares in the IPO aftermarket. We directly test
this prediction using detailed institutional trading data, which allow us to control for
important variables that may affect both the selling decision and choice of the broker,
such as the relationship between the institution and the lead underwriters or any other
institution-IPO specific characteristic. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to
directly test this prediction. Our analyses document a robust buy/sell asymmetry in
the choice of the broker in the IPO aftermarket: institutional investors are significantly
less likely to sell than buy through the lead underwriters during the first month of
trading after the IPO.
We consider two factors that may affect the hiding incentives of financial institutions.
First, if the buy/sell asymmetry is driven by hiding incentives, then it should be the
strongest in cold IPOs: both the “allocation sales explanation” and the “laddering
explanation” predict the lead underwriters to be concerned the most about investors’
selling activity in weak offerings. Second, if the buy/sell asymmetry is driven by hiding
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incentives, then we should not be able to detect it when there are no incentives to hide
stock sales from the lead underwriters. We perform placebo tests to show that the
buy/sell asymmetry disappears after few months from the issue date and in a matched
sample of non-IPO stocks. Overall, our evidence is consistent with the predictions of
the hide-and-sell hypothesis.
The buy/sell asymmetry may be driven by both the “allocation sales explanation”
and the novel “laddering explanation”. Our data and methodology allow us to dis-
entangle allocation sales from investors’ buying and selling activity in the secondary
market. Hence, we can investigate the reasons behind institutions’ hiding behavior, in
order to understand whether it is driven by flipping or laddering motives.
We argue that the “allocation sales explanation” might be overall weak in the United
States because underwriters receive reports documenting the allocation sales of their
customers. Flipping of shares is tracked via the Depository Trust Company’s (DTC)
IPO Tracking System and the lead underwriters receive two types of reports (Aggarwal
(2003)). The first report provides them with client-level information about flipping ac-
tivity of the investors to whom they allocated IPO shares. The second report provides
them with information about the aggregate flipping activity for each syndicate member,
but this does not include client-level details. Therefore, lead underwriters can detect
their clients who sold their allocations, but do not have direct access to the identity of
flippers that received their allocations from other syndicate members. Consequently,
investors that received IPO shares from other syndicate members have some chances
to hide their flipping activity from the lead underwriters by avoiding selling through
them. Morevover, flipping reports are not flawless and there is anecdotal evidence of
institutional investors circumventing the DTC IPO Tracking System.4 Though imper-
4Griffin et al. (2007) report that “in March 2005, the NASD fined Spear, Leeds and Kellogg with
$1 million for concealing IPO shares from the DTC system from August 1997 to January 2001”.
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fect, the DTC IPO Tracking System dampens the scope for hiding flipping trades. The
risk of being caught by the lead underwriters might not be zero even for other syndicate
members’ clients, as lead underwriters could exploit their relationship with the other
syndicate members or use allocations and aggregate flipping data to infer flippers’ iden-
tities. Since a great portion of the IPO shares are underwritten by the lead managers
(Corwin and Schultz (2005)), the incentive to hide allocations sales might be overall
weak.
On the contrary, the hiding behavior that we investigate in this paper, that is, selling
IPO shares through non-lead brokers, might allow investors to break their laddering
agreements without being caught by the lead underwriters. Ladderers may purchase
the shares that they committed to buy through the lead underwriters and then sell
the shares in excess of their optimal holdings through any other broker. Since these
stock sales (henceforth, “other sales” or “other sell trades” or “secondary sales”) do not
involve allocation sales, they are not detected by the DTC IPO Tracking System and
leave scope for hiding them.
We disentangle allocation sales from other sales and, consistent with the above
arguments and contrary to the conventional view, we find that flipping is not a relevant
motive for the institutions to hide their sell trades: the buy/sell asymmetry is mainly
driven by sell trades other than allocation sales. Furthermore, we investigate other
predictions of the novel laddering explanation. First, if investors break their laddering
agreements, then it has to be the case that they sell the shares that they committed
to buy through the lead underwriters. Second, if investors hide the breaking of the
agreement and use the simple hiding technology considered in this paper, then they
should tend to execute a higher proportion of their sell trades through non-lead brokers
when they buy shares through the lead underwriters and when they sell secondary
shares. Third, investors that buy through the lead underwriters in the aftermarket and
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want to hide their secondary sales, should avoid allocation sales. Because of flipping
reports, allocation sales signal to the underwriters that an investor sold more shares than
it bought in the aftermarket, meaning that it sold also secondary shares. These three
arguments predict a positive correlation between the proportion of sell trades executed
through non-lead brokers, the volume of shares bought through the lead underwriters,
and the volume of other sales, and a negative correlation between the volume of shares
bought through the lead underwriters and the volume of shares flipped. Overall, we
find evidence consistent with these predictions and with financial institutions breaking
their laddering agreements.
Finally, we find that hiding sell trades is an effective strategy to circumvent under-
writers’ monitoring mechanisms: the more institutions hide their sell trades, the less
they are penalized in subsequent IPO allocations.
The idea that investors may hide their sell trades is not new. However, the literature
has exclusively framed it within the allocation sales explanation. Some existing studies
suggest that investors might try to hide their allocation sales from the lead underwriters
in the IPO aftermarket. For example, Griffin et al. (2007) find that investors are overall
net sellers through brokers that do not belong to the syndicate group and net buyers
through the lead underwriters during the first month after the issue. Using institutional
trading data, Chemmanur et al. (2010) finds that institutional investors abnormally
split their orders in the IPO aftermarket and suggest that it might be an attempt
to hide flipping trades. In both papers, the idea is that flippers would like to hide
their allocations sales in order to preserve their business with the lead underwriters in
subsequent IPOs.
Though suggestive and relevant, the existing evidence is far from being conclusive.
Investors could split their orders or sell through non-lead brokers for reasons other
than hiding. For example, they could split their trades in order to generate a stream of
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abnormal commissions to the lead underwriters as a reward for receiving IPO allocations
(Reuter (2006), Nimalendran et al. (2007), Goldstein et al. (2011), and Jenkinson et al.
(2017)). The difference in net buy between lead underwriters’ clients and non-lead
brokers’ clients might be driven by the characteristics of the trading institutions, such
as their relationship with the lead underwriters. Since institutional investors tend to
keep stable relationships with their brokers (Goldstein et al. (2009)), some of them being
connected to underwriting brokers through common educational background (Hwang
et al. (2018)), institutions that are usual underwriters’ clients are more likely to trade
with them in the IPO aftermarket. In order to preserve this relationship, they may
also be more likely to support IPO prices by buying or avoiding to sell in the secondary
market. On the contrary, institutions that are not usual underwriters’ clients are more
likely to trade with their own usual brokers in the IPO aftermarket and may also be
more likely to sell IPO stocks. Moreover, the existence of flipping reports dampens the
scope for hiding allocations sales through any trading strategy in the aftermarket. The
questions whether, to what extent, and why institutions may hide their trades remained
open. The aim of this paper is to shed light on them.
Our findings contribute two streams of research. First, our paper is related to an ex-
tensive literature that investigates the benefits and costs of the bookbuilding method of
bringing companies public. While underwriters’ discretion may have the benefits of in-
centivizing investors’ information production (Benveniste and Spindt (1989), Benveniste
and Wilhelm (1990), Sherman (2000), Cornelli and Goldreich (2001), and Sherman and
Titman (2002)) and of placing allocations in the hands of long-term investors (Aggar-
wal (2003), Jenkinson and Jones (2004), Jenkinson and Jones (2009), and Chemmanur
et al. (2010)), an increasing body of research unravels the conflicts of interest inherent
to the bookbuilding method (Loughran and Ritter (2004), Reuter (2006), Griffin et al.
(2007), Hao (2007), Nimalendran et al. (2007), Ritter and Zhang (2007), Jenkinson and
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Jones (2009), Liu and Ritter (2010), Goldstein et al. (2011), Ritter (2011), Jenkinson
et al. (2017), and Hwang et al. (2018)).5 As the existing literature mainly focuses on
the conflicts of interest between underwriters and issuers, we enrich it by investigating
a so far overlooked moral hazard problem faced by investors. Our findings suggest that
investors’ hiding behavior may affect the potential benefits and costs of underwriters’
discretion and stimulate further research to study the incentives of IPO investors.
Second, we shed light on the determinants of the choice of the broker by financial
institutions. Our findings are consistent with models in which investors face a trade-
off between preserving long-term relationships with brokers that give them access to
premium services and the need to hide their trading strategies (Goldstein et al. (2009)).
We find a clear persistence in the choice of the broker, which cannot be explained trading
costs and depends strongly on the long-term relationship between institutions and their
brokers. We show how hiding incentives affect the choice of the broker in the context
of IPOs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our sample selec-
tion criteria, defines the main variables used in our analyses, and provides summary
statistics. Section 3 presents our baseline results and documents that institutions are
less likely to trade through the lead underwriters when they sell than when they buy
shares in the IPO aftermarket, especially in cold IPOs, consistent with our hide-and-
sell hypothesis. This section includes placebo analyses to check that this behavior is
not present when there are no hiding incentives. Section 4 investigates the motivations
of institutional hiding behavior. Section 5 rules out potential alternative explanations
and addresses endogeneity problems.Section 6 investigates the effectiveness of the hid-
ing behavior in an attempt of the institutions to preserve their relationship with the
5See Lowry et al. (2017) for a recent comprehensive survey of the IPO literature.
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underwriter. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2. Data and summary statistics
2.1. IPO data
We use the Thomson Financial Security Data Company (SDC) database to iden-
tify IPOs made in the United States from 1999 to 2010.6 We exclude all American
Depository Receipts (ADRs), Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), unit and rights
offerings, closed-end funds, IPOs with SIC codes between 6000 and 6199 and IPOs with
offer price smaller than $5. We further require IPOs to have a match with the Center
for Research in Security Prices database (CRSP) within seven calendar days from the
issue. These filters leave us with 1,439 IPOs. In addition, we require IPOs to have
a CUSIP match with the ANcerno/Abel Noser Solutions database, which provides us
with detailed institutional trading data. We describe ANcerno trading data in the next
subsection. This criterion leads us to drop 51 IPOs. We drop three IPO firms that show
inconsistent data: these firms show trading activity in the ANcerno database before the
IPO date. Finally, we require at least one lead underwriter of each IPO to be matched
with a broker of the Abel Noser Solutions database. This filter leaves out 24 firms.
Our final sample consists of 1,361 IPOs involving 89 distinct lead underwriters. The
number of IPOs varies considerably by year, ranging from 14 in 2008 to 373 in 1999.
By matching SDC and CRSP, we get the percentage return from the IPO offer price
to the first day closing price (Underpricing) and we winsorize it at the 95% level. The
average underpricing in our sample is 37.6% and the median is 14.8%. Since our hide-
and-sell hypothesis depends on underpricing, we split our sample into terciles based on
this variable. We define an IPO as “hot” if it is in the highest tercile (Underpricing >
6We apply corrections to our sample of IPOs using the information provided by Jay R. Ritter at
the University of Florida as of April 2014: https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipo-data/.
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29.4% ), “weak” if it is in the middle tercile (5.1% > Underpricing ≤ 29.4%), and
“cold” if it is in the lowest tercile (Underpricing ≤ 5.1%).
2.2. Institutional trading data in the IPO aftermarket
We obtain institutional trading data for our sample of 1,361 IPOs from the AN-
cerno/Abel Noser Solutions database. The IPO trading data covers the period from
January 1999 to March 2011. For each trade placed by an institution, we get the follow-
ing information: the name and the identity code (“managercode”) of the institution,
the name and the identity code (“brokercode”) of the broker executing the trade, the
trading date, the CUSIP of the stock traded, the number of shares traded, a variable
identifying the side of the trade (buy or sell), the execution price, and the commis-
sions paid. The reader may refer to the Appendix A for the detailed description of the
database.
We require trades to have non-missing managercodes and brokercodes, and to be
sent to ANcerno by pension plan sponsors or money managers.7 We match the Abel
Noser Solutions database to the Thomson Reuters Institutional 13F Holdings database
by institution names. We require institutions to have a match with 13F. A description
of the matching procedure across several databases is provided in Figure A1 of the
Appendix A.
Summary statistics for more than 1.2 million institutional trades during the first year
after the issue date are presented in Table 1.8 The trades in the sample are placed by 227
distinct institutions of Abel Noser Solutions and are executed by 700 different brokers.
The average trade involves 6565 shares. 8.2 billion IPO shares are traded during the
7This means that we require trades to have client-type code equal to 1 or 2. We exclude the
relatively small amount of trades sent to ANcerno by brokers.
8Results are similar if we exclude IPOs issued after March 2010, thus ensuring we have full 12
months of trading data for all IPOs in our sample
11
first year from the issue, for a total value of 251.9 billion US dollars. Lead underwriters
have a large weight in the brokerage market of IPO stocks: during the first month after
the IPO date, 40.4% of the IPO shares are traded through the lead underwriters. The
percentage decreases in subsequent months to about 15%. The market share of brokers
that did not participate in the underwriting syndicate (henceforth, “other brokers”)
shows the opposite pattern: it is 52.4% during the first month after the IPO date and
it increases in subsequent months to about 70%.
Our hide-and-sell hypothesis predicts that institutional decision to trade with the
lead underwriters depends on the side of their trade. Figure 1 breaks down the market
share of the lead underwriters for buy trades (black lines) and sell trades (light grey
lines). For each IPO, we compute the percentage volume of institutional buy and
sell trades executed by the lead underwriters and other brokers in each month from the
IPO date. Then we average these percentages across IPOs and compute 95% confidence
intervals around the means. Panel (A) shows that the weight of the lead underwriters
during the first month after the IPO date differs significantly depending on the trade
side: it is almost 40% for buy trades and it is below 30% for sell trades, consistent
with hiding behavior.9 The market share of buy and sell trades becomes insignificant
after the first month, consistent with hiding incentives being at place only during the
first month of trading. Panels (B)-(D) break down the brokerage market share by
underpricing terciles. We notice that the difference between buy and sell trades is
mainly driven by cold IPOs, consistent with the intuition that hiding incentives are
stronger in cold IPOs.
In the rest of the paper, we aggregate Abel Noser Solutions’ trade volumes at the
9These numbers are slightly different from those in Table 1 because Figure 1 computes the average
broker market shares in IPOs, while Table 1 computes brokerage market shares in the IPO aftermarket
for IPOs as a whole.
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daily level. Thus, our trading dataset comprises observations at the IPO-institution-
broker-day level. Henceforth, with the word “trade” we mean “daily trade”. The daily
level of aggregation allows us to neglet intra-day trading decisions, which might involve
several factors unrelated to our subject of study, such as institutions’ churning shares
to generate commissions to the lead underwriters (Goldstein et al. (2011)). Morevover,
it allows us to avoid complications related to the intra-day trading time reported by
the Abel Noser Solutions database. Figure 2 focuses on the first 21 trading days after
the IPO. For each IPO, we compute the total amount bought and sold in each day by
institutions that trade through the lead underwriters, through other syndicate members,
and through brokers that did not participate in the IPO syndicate (bars). We also
compute the cumulative netbuy of lead managers’ clients, syndicate members’ clients,
and other brokers’ clients (lines). The volume traded is scaled by the number of shares
issued and it is averaged across IPOs. Panel (A) plots buy, sell, and cumulative netbuy
volumes for all sample IPOs. Broadly consistent with the existing literature (see Griffin
et al. (2007), we observe that institutions are net buyers through lead managers and
syndicate members and net sellers through other brokers in the first few trading days
after the IPO. Moreover, the daily volume sold tends to be larger through other brokers
than through the lead underwriters; on the contrary, the daily volume bought tends
to be larger through the lead underwriters than through other brokers. Finally, the
difference in net buy between lead underwriters’ clients and other brokers’ clients is
greater in cold IPOs. This is broadly consistent with hiding behavior.
The graphical evidence presented in this section suggests that some hiding behav-
ior might be at place, but it is far from being conclusive. For example, the difference
between buy and sell trades might be driven by institutional characteristics affecting
both the decision to sell and the decision to trade with the lead underwriters, without
any them having an intention to hide their trades. Institutions that decide to buy IPO
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shares and support the price of cold IPOs might be usual lead underwriters’ clients;
therefore, they might also tend to trade more through lead underwriters in the IPO
aftermarket. Institutions that decide to sell IPO shares migth not be usual lead un-
derwriters’ clients; therefore, they might also tend to trade more through their usual
brokers in the IPO aftermarket. Our institution-level analysis in section 3 sheds light
on these issues and directly tests the predictions of the hide-and-sell hypothesis.
2.3. Identifying institutional IPO allocations sales
We identify institutional IPO allocations sales following the algorithm proposed by
Chemmanur et al. (2010), which is consistent with the Depository Trust Company’s
(DTC) IPO Tracking System. The objective is to disentangle an institutional alloca-
tions sales from its buying and selling activity in the IPO aftermarket. In order to do
so, we classify as IPO allocation sales only shares sold in excess of the shares bought
until a specific point in time by an institution. For example, consider an institution
that buys 500 shares in the secondary market during the first day after the issue date
and then sells 300 shares on the second day and 300 shares on the third day. Then the
IPO allocation sales of that institution are equal to zero on day 1 and 2 and are equal
to 100 on day 3.
Our sample institutions flip 3.2% of the shares offered within the first 21 trading
days post-IPO and continue to sell their allocations in subsequent months. By the end
of the first year, our sample institutions flip 8.5% of the shares issued on average. The
amount of flipping is the highest for hot IPOs (almost 12% at the end of the first year)
and the lowest for cold IPOs (less than 5% at the end of the first year). For more details
on flipping activity of our sample institutions refer to figure B2 of the Appendix.
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2.4. Identifying institutional IPO allocations
We identify IPO allocations by combining institutional trading data with quarterly
holdings data reported in 13F. The basic idea is to compute IPO allocations as the
difference between the institutional holdings in the IPO firm at the first 13F filing date
following the IPO and the net buying by the institution in the IPO firm between the
IPO date and the 13F filing date. However, as pointed out by Chemmanur et al. (2010),
it is unlikely to compute allocations precisely by matching 13F and the Abel Noser’s
Solution Database because of data differences in the two databases. For example, 13F
might not contain all stock holdings, as institutions are required to disclose common
stock positions greater than 10,000 shares or $200,000. This kind of matching problems
might generate some inconsistencies when computing allocations as holdings minus net
buying. For example, we might compute negative allocations and/or allocations smaller
than the amount of shares flipped.
In order to rule out these inconsistencies, we complement our allocation proxy with
allocation sale data. The idea is that an IPO allocation has to be at least equal to
the amount of shares flipped by the institution. Formally, we proxy IPO allocations as
follows. We denote Hi,j as the number of shares of IPO i held by institution j at the
first filing date after the IPO; ∆i,j as the total netbuy of IPO i shares by institution
j between the IPO date and the first filing date after the IPO; and Let Fi,j as the
number of shares of IPO i flipped by institution j – as computed in section 2.3 – in the
first three months after the IPO. We then compute the percentage of shares of IPO i
allocated to institution j, AllocPerci,j, as:
AllocPerci,j =
max(Hi,j − ∆i,j, Fi,j)
SharesIssuedi
100
and we winsorize it at the 95% level. Table 2 reports IPO allocations summary
statistics at the institution and issuer level. Conditional on receiving an allocation,
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an average institution gets 1.89% of the issue. In an average IPO, about 23 sample
institutions receive an allocation and get 42.7% of the offer.
Allocations vary with underpricing. Institutions that receive cold IPO shares get
a larger percentage of the issue than institutions that receive hot IPO shares (2.53%
versus 1.53%). However, the number of institutions that receive allocations is much
smaller in cold IPOs than in hot IPOs (13.6 versus 30.6). Thus, the total allocation to
institutional investors is lower in cold IPOs than in hot IPOs (34.3% versus 47%).
3. Do institutional investors hide their sell trades?
3.1. Main specifications
If investors systematically hide some of their sell trades from the lead underwriters
(hide-and-sell hypothesis) by trading with other brokers, then we should observe the
probability of trading through the lead underwriters to be lower for sell trades than
for buy trades in the IPO aftermarket. In order to test this prediction, we run several
specifications of the following linear probability model (LPM)10:
LeadDummyi,j,b,t = α + βSelli,j,b,t +Xi,j,b,tΓ + δj + θi + λi,j + ui,j,b,t
where Selli,j,b,t is a dummy variable equal to one if the institution j is selling the
IPO i through broker b on day t and zero if it is buying. The dependent variable,
LeadDummyi,j,b,t, is a dummy variable equal to one if the broker b executing the trade
is any of the lead underwriters of IPO i and zero otherwise. Xi,j,b,t is a vector of
10We choose the linear probability model because it allows us to control for fixed effects without
incurring in the incidental parameter problem and to estimate marginal effects. The potential bias and
inconsistency of OLS with binary outcome are unlikely to be a concern in our setting, as the average
value of the dependent variable is not at the boundaries of the unit interval (it is 0.292). For monitoring
purposes, we keep track of the proportion of predicted probabilities outside the [0, 1] interval in our
regression tables.
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control variables, which are described below; δj, θi, and λi,j are institution, IPO, and
institution-IPO fixed effects; ui,j,b,t is the error term, which we allow to be correlated
within institution. The hide-and-sell hypothesis predicts β < 0.
The vector of control variables includes the trading volume RelV ol, which is the
number of shares traded by the institution scaled by the number of shares issued and
multiplied by 100. We control for the relationship between institutional investors and
lead underwriters. Lead underwriters’ usual clients are more likely to choose a lead un-
derwriter as a broker at any point in time, including the IPO aftermarket (see Goldstein
et al. (2009)). They might also be more likely to support the IPO price to preserve their
relationship with the underwriters, thus being less likely to sell IPO shares than other
investors. Conversely, institutions that are not usual underwriters’ clients are less likely
to trade with them and might be more likely to be IPO sellers. Therefore, a negative
correlation between the decision to sell IPO shares and the decision to trade with a lead
underwriter might be driven by the relationship between investors and underwriters.
We control for it by means of the variable NormalTradeLead. For each institution-IPO
pair, we compute the percentage volume traded in non-IPO stocks by the institution
through the lead underwriters in a 6-month period prior to the issue.11 We compute this
variable separately for buy and sell trades, to capture any potential heterogeneity in the
investor-lead underwriters relationship by trade side. We include in the specification
the variable Day, which is the day in which the trade is executed relative to the issue
date, in order to control for the likely decreasing trend in the probability of trading with
a lead underwriter. One important determinant of the choice to trade with the lead un-
derwriters might be their trading expenses. ExcLeadComm is the average percentage
commission to the lead underwriters minus the average percentage commission to any
11The 6-month period includes trades in non-IPO stocks executed from the trading day -147 to the
trading day -22 before the issue date.
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other broker paid by sample institutions in the first 21 trading days after the issue date.
With this variable we capture how expensive it is to trade with the lead underwriters
relative to other brokers in the IPO aftermarket. We compute this variable separately
for buy and sell trades to capture any potential heterogeneity in brokerage commissions
by trade side. Finally, we control for the percentage IPO allocation received by an
institution, AllocPerc. Institutions that receive IPO allocations might be more likely
to trade with the underwriters for several reasons, including quid-pro-quo agreements
to generate a stream brokerage commissions to the lead underwriters (Goldstein et al.
(2011), Reuter (2006), and Nimalendran et al. (2007)) and “laddering” agreements to
buy shares in the IPO aftermarket (Griffin et al. (2007)).
Table 3 reports the OLS estimation results. We use standard errors clustered at
the institution level for inference.12 Panel (A) includes trades executed during the
first 21 trading days after the issue date. We focus on this period because lead un-
derwriters’ practices suggest that investors’ incentives to hide their sell trades should
exist mainly during the first month of trading. Lead underwriters track IPO flipping
through the Depository Trust Company’s (DTC) IPO Tracking System and engage in
market stabilization activities usually during the first 30 calendar days after the issue
date (see Aggarwal (2000)). In Column (1) we regress LeadDummy on Sell; column
(2) introduces control variables in the specification; columns (3), (4), and (5) control
for institution, institution and firm, and institution-firm fixed effects.
The coefficient of the variable Sell is negative and statistically significant in all
specifications. Considering the estimate in column (1), institutional investors are 6
percentage points less likely to trade through a lead underwriter when they sell IPO
shares than when they buy, consistent with the hide-and-sell hypothesis. The coefficient
12In unreported analyses, we allow the error term to be correlated within IPO, clustering standard
errors at the firm level. The results become stronger.
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is statistically significant at least at the 5% level. It is also economically significant: the
probability of selling with a lead underwriter is almost 20% less than the probability of
buying (0.06/0.32). The correlation survives when we control for institution, firm, and
institution-firm fixed effects. Column (3) controls for institution fixed effects, such as
their usual trading strategies in IPOs. Column (4) introduces IPO fixed effects, which
capture any IPO-specific characteristics, including the identity of the lead underwriters.
It might be argued that NormalTradeLead controls only for the past relationship
between institutions and lead underwriters in brokarage services, but not for their
future expected relationship nor for their relationship in other services; in column (5)
we control for any institution-IPO specific factor, exploiting within institution-IPO
variation: an institution that is both buying and selling a given IPO is more likely to
trade with the lead underwriters when it buys than when it sells.
The coefficient of RelV ol is positive and significant in all specifications: institutions
that make larger trades are more likely to trade with the lead underwriters. A one
percentage point increase in the trading volume is associated with about 13 percentage
points increase in the probability of trading with a lead underwriter. As expected,
there is a positive and statistically significant correlation between LeadDummy and
NormalTradeLead. A one percentage point increase in the proportion of trades that
the institution normally execute through the lead underwriters is associated with about
0.9 percentage points increase in the probability of trading with a lead underwriter in the
IPO aftermarket. The coefficient becomes much smaller and statistically insignificant
when we control for institution-firm fixed effects, suggesting that the relationship be-
tween investors and underwriters is homogeneuos across trade side and, thus, captured
by these fixed effects. As expected, the coefficient of Day is negative and statistically
significant. A one day increase in the trading time relative to the issue date is asso-
ciated with about one percentage point decrease in the probability of trading with a
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lead underwriter. The coefficient of ExcLeadComm is negative in all specifications.
However, it is statistically significant only when we control for institution-firm fixed
effect. Even though commissions does not seeem to be a main driver of the choice of
the broker, differences in trading commissions across trade side help explain the within
institution-IPO variation of LeadDummy. Finally, AllocPerc is only weakly significant
in one specification (at the 10% level). Moreover, its sign flips across specifications. We
cannot make definitive conclusions about its correlation with the choice of the broker
in the IPO aftermarket.
In unreported results we replicate our analysis considering trades executed during
the first 7 trading days after the issue date. The coefficient on Sell gets much stronger
in all specifications, suggesting that most of the documented effect is concentrated in
the first few trading days after the IPO.
3.2. Hiding incentives in cold IPOs
Hiding incentives are stronger in cold IPOs. Underwriters are more likely con-
cerned by sell trades when the aftermarket demand for the IPO stock is weak, because
sell trades put additional downward pressure on the price (Chemmanur et al. (2010)).
Hence, we hypothesize the buy/sell asymmetry in the choice of the broker to be stronger
in cold IPOs. We define the variable ColdIPOi to be equal to one if the firm i is in
the lowest tercile of the variable Underpricingi and zero otherwise. We introduce an
interaction variable between ColdIPOi and Selli,j,b,t in our regression specifications.
Under the hide-and-sell hypothesis, we expect the coefficient on the interaction term to
be negative. We report the estimation results in Column (6) of Table 3.
Consistent with the hide-and-sell hypothesis, the negative correlation between LeadDummy
and Sell is stronger when hiding incentives are more pronounced. The coefficient of the
interaction term is negative and statistically significant at least at the 5% level. The
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economic magnitude is also significant: investors are about 10.5 percentage points less
likely to trade with a lead underwriter when they sell shares of cold IPOs than when
they buy shares in cold IPOs.
3.3. Placebo tests
If institutional investors are less likely to sell through the lead underwriters because
they try to hide their sell trades, then we should not observe this behavior when there
is no incentive to hide.
Lead underwriters’ practices suggest that investors’ incentives to hide their sell
trades should exist mainly during the first month of trading. Hence, we should not
detect systematic hiding behavior after the first month. Column (7) of Table 3 im-
plements our regression analysis for institutional investors’ trading activity during the
third month after the IPO date. The coefficient of Sell is not statistically different from
zero and its magnitude is very small.
The hiding incentive is peculiar to IPOs: it should not exist for non-IPO stocks.
Hence, we test the hide-and-sell hypothesis in a matched sample of trades in non-IPO
stocks. We match trades as follows. First, we require candidate non-IPO stocks to be
similar to the matched IPO. For each IPO, we select candidate non-IPO stocks that: (i)
are in the same one-digit industry; (ii) are in the same quintile of market capitalization;
(iii) are in the same tercile of Tobin’s Q.13 Then, we match each buy (sell) trade in IPO
stocks with a buy (sell) trade made by the same institution in a candidate non-IPO
stock within a 21 trading days window from the IPO date. The matched trade is the
one with the closest dollar volume. We lose 1,909 trades in 55 IPOs because of missing
data about market capitalization, industry, or Tobin’s Q. Moreover, we lose 13,677
trades because of no match found. Our final sample consists of 28,990 trades in non-
13We get this data from CRSP and COMPUSTAT.
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IPO stocks matched to 1,109 IPOs.14 Column 8 of Table 3 implements our regression
analysis for institutions’ trading activity in non-IPO stocks. The coefficient of Sell is
not statistically different from zero and economically small.
Overall, our placebo tests confirm that the buy/sell asymmetry in the choice of the
broker is peculiar to the IPO aftermarket, consistent with hiding incentives.
4. Why do institutional investors hide their trades?
In this section, we investigate the drivers and motives of institutional investors’
hiding behavior. The existing literature suggests that investors might try to hide their
allocations sales in order to preserve their business with the lead underwriters in the
IPO allocations market (Griffin et al. (2007), Chemmanur et al. (2010)). Though
relevant, consistent, and sound, the incentive to hide allocation sales might be over-
all weak because of the lead underwriters’ ability to infer flippers’ identities: though
imperfect, the flipping reports produced via the DTC IPO Tracking System dampen
unambiguously the investors’ chances to hide their allocation sales. We find evidence
consistent with this view by introducing in our baseline regression 4 the dummy vari-
able AllocationSaleDummy that takes the value of one when the sell trade contains an
allocation sale and zero otherwise.15 AllocationSaleDummy trades are a subset of Sell
trades, thus every AllocationSaleDummy is a Sell, but not vice versa. For the sake
of the interpretation of the regression coefficients, AllocationSaleDummy is essentially
14The median volume difference between matched non-IPO trades and original IPO trades is 50
dollars. The correlation between dollar volumes of original and matched trades is 0.7.
15Since we observe allocation sales at the institution-IPO-day level (see section 2.3), this definition
of AllocationSaleDummy may be inaccurate if investor j executes both secondary sales and allocation
sales of IPO i during the same trading day t through several distinct brokers b. In our sample, this
problem can affect at most 645 observations out of 44,576. In Table 4, we assume that all of these 645
sell trades contain an allocation sale. In unreported analyses, we exclude these 645 observations from
the sample and find similar results.
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an interaction variable because it can take the value of one only when Sell is also one.16
Table 4 shows that the buy/sell asymmetry is mainly driven by sell trades other than
allocation sales (we refer to these sales as secondary sales throughout the paper. The
coefficient of AllocationSaleDummy is positive and significant, meaning that sell trades
are significantly more likely to be executed through the lead underwriters when they
contain allocation sales, than when they do not contain allocation sales. Nevertheless,
there is evidence of some hiding activity also for allocation sales: sell trades that contain
allocations sales are somewhat less likely to be executed through the lead underwriters
than buy trades, as the coefficient of Sell plus the coefficient of AllocationSaleDummy
is a negative number.
We suggest a novel reason for why investors might have an incentive to hide their
sell trades. An investor that enters in a laddering agreement a là Hao (2007) receives
an IPO allocation and agrees with the lead underwriters to generate additional demand
in the IPO aftermarket by buying shares. As argued by Griffin et al. (2007), this form
of laddering helps explaining why investors are overall net buyers through lead under-
writers in the IPO aftermarket. However, investors might have an incentive to break
the laddering agreement if the shares bought in the secondary market are in excess of
their optimal holding in the IPO firm. A way to do it without being caught by the
lead underwriters is to sell the shares in excess through any other broker. If investors
systematically break their laddering agreements, then we should observe them simul-
taneously buying through the lead underwriters and selling through non-lead brokers.
Column (5) of Table 3 is consistent with this view: since we control for institution-firm
fixed effects, we do observe institutional investors that simultaneously buy and sell an
16This may raise a concern of collinearity between AllocationSaleDummy and Sell. Standard
regression diagnostic suggests that this is not the case. In unreported results, we modify our regression
specification by subtracting allocation sales from the sell transactions. Our results are consistent when
we replace our Sell variable by the Sell net of allocations.
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IPO being more likely to buy than sell through the lead underwriters. Table 3 detects
a behavior which is consistent with investors breaking the laddering agreement, but it
is silent on how relevant this hiding motive is. If laddering is a relevant explanation for
hiding sell trades, we should observe a clear positive correlation between hiding behavior
(i.e., selling through non-lead brokers) and buying through the lead underwriters.
In order to dig into the drivers of hiding behavior, we decompose trading volume
in four parts. Let V Ti,j be the total number of shares traded by institution j in IPO
i during the first 21 trading days after the issue and let Ni be the number of shares
issued in IPO i. The total volume traded can be written as:
V Ti,j
Ni
=
BLi,j
Ni
+
F Ti,j
Ni
+
STi,j − F Ti,j
Ni
+
BNLi,j
Ni
where F Ti,j is the total number of shares of IPO i flipped by institution j during
the first 21 trading days, BLi,j (S
L
i,j) is the number of shares of IPO i bought (sold)
by institution j through the lead underwriters during the first 21 trading days, BNLi,j
(SNLi,j ) is the number of shares of IPO i bought (sold) by institution j through brokers
other than the lead underwriters during the first 21 trading days, and BT = BL +BNL
(ST = SL + SNL). The third component on the right hand side of the identity, (STi,j −
F Ti,j)/Ni, is the institution’s total volume of “secondary” shares sold, meaning total sales
excluding allocations sales, scaled by the number of shares issued. In order to capture
the propensity to sell through brokers other than the lead underwriters, we compute the
percentage of shares of IPO i sold by institution j through non-lead brokers, SNLi,j /S
T
i,j.
Since we are interested in analyzing institutional selling, we constrain our dataset to
institutions that have positive sales (i.e., STi,j > 0 ). We count 9,018 institution-firm
observations.
Under the laddering explanation, institutions tend to sell shares through non-lead
brokers, while having bought them in the IPO aftermarket through the lead underwrit-
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ers. Hence, controlling for how the institution normally trades with the lead under-
writers (NormalTradeLead), we should observe the percentage of shares sold through
non-lead brokers, SNLi,j /S
T
i,j, to be positively correlated with the relative volume of shares
bought through the lead underwriters, BLi,j/Ni, and the relative volume of “secondary”
shares sold, (STi,j −F Ti,j)/Ni. These predictions are conditional on the institution j hav-
ing received some allocation in the IPO i, as institutions involved in laddering received
some allocation in the IPO. Hence, under the laddering motive, these predictions should
not hold for institutions with no allocations. Moreover, they should not hold after the
first month of trading, when the incentives for institutions to hide their sales become
weaker.
In order to test these predictions, we perform a linear projection of the propensity
to sell through non-lead brokers on the trading volume components, running several
specifications of the following regression:
SNLi,j
STi,j
= γ0 + γ1
BLi,j
Ni
+ γ2
STi,j − F Ti,j
Ni
+ γ3
F Ti,j
Ni
+ γ4
BNLi,j
Ni
+Xi,jΓ + φi + ϕj + vi,j
where Xi,j is a vector of control variables (which includes NormalTradeLeadi,j
and AllocPerci,j), φi and ϕj are firm and institution fixed effects, and vi,j is the error
term, which we allow to be correlated within institution. The laddering motive for
hiding predicts γ1 > 0 and γ2 > 0 for institutions that received allocations and trade
during the first month after the issue. Table 5 reports the OLS results. All ratios are
multiplied by 100, thus being expressed as percentages. We use institution-clustered
standard errors for inference.17
In Columns (1)-(4), we perform the regression on first-month trading data, includ-
ing in the sample institutions that received some allocations (i.e., institutions with
17In unreported analyses, we allow the error term to be correlated within IPO, clustering standard
errors at the firm level. The results are consistent.
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AllocPerci,j > 0). Overall results are consistent with the laddering explanation. The
coefficients γ1 and γ2 are positive in all specifications: institutions tend to execute a
higher proportion of their sell trades through non-lead brokers when they buy more
shares through the lead underwriters and when they sell more “secondary” shares. Ac-
cording to Column (4), a one unit increase in the volume of shares bought through the
lead underwriters (volume of “secondary” shares sold) as a percentage of the amount
of shares issued is associated with a 1.24 (2.02) percentage points increase in the pro-
portion of sell trades executed through non-lead brokers. Results are also statistically
significant at the 1% level in most specifications. The specification in column (2), which
does not control for fixed effects, shows insignificant or weakly significant results. Firm
fixed effects keep IPO characteristics constant, including the identity of the lead un-
derwriters, which might be relevant factors affecting both the propensity to sell and
the amount of shares bought in the aftermarket through lead underwriters. For ex-
ample, some underwriters might have simultaneously a higher proportion of sell trades
executed through them and a larger buying activity from investors than other under-
writers, thus making it difficult to detect the laddering hiding motive in specifications
(1) and (2).18 Controlling for IPO fixed effects allows us to keep these factors constant,
exploiting within IPO variation. Hence, specifications (3) and (4) are more suitable
tests of the laddering motive for hiding.
Consistent with flipping not being a relevant explanation for the Buy/Sell asym-
metry we document, we find that γ3 is negative in most specifications and statistically
significant at the 1% level when controlling for IPO and institution fixed effects: the
proportion of shares sold through non-lead brokers is lower when institutions flip more
18In an unreported analysis, we aggregate data at the lead underwriter level and, indeed, we observe
a negative correlation between the proportion of sell trades through non-lead brokers and the volume
components of interest, confirming the importance of controlling for IPO fixed effects in our regressions.
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of their IPO allocations.
In Column (5) we perform a placebo analysis, including in our sample only the in-
stitutions with no IPO allocations (i.e., institutions with AllocPerci,j = 0). Consistent
with the laddering motive for hiding, γ1 and γ2 are not statistically different from zero
for institutions with no allocations; in addition, γ1 enters the regression with a negative
sign. In column (6) we perform another placebo analysis, running the regression on
volumes traded during the third month after the issue. We include in the sample only
institutions that received a positive allocation. Consistent with the laddering explana-
tion for hiding, γ1 and γ2 are not significantly positive after the first month of trading;
both coefficients enter the regression with a negative sign. In addition, γ1 is statistically
significant, consistent with hiding incentives not being at place after the first month.
The remaining volume component, that is the relative amount of shares bought
through brokers other than the lead underwriters (BuyNonLead or BNLi,j /Ni), is in
general positively correlated with the proportion of sell trades executed through the
lead underwriters, especially in placebo samples. Intuitively, it makes sense: institu-
tions that buy more through non-lead brokers also tend to sell more through non-lead
brokers. Noticeably, this positive correlation disappears in specifications (3) and (4),
where the laddering hiding motive becomes an important driver of institutional behav-
ior. Unsurprisingly, the coefficient of NormalTradeLead is negative and significant in
all specifications, including the placebo analyses: the higher the proportion of trades
that the institution usually executes through the lead underwriters, the lower the pro-
portion of sell trades executed through non-lead brokers in IPOs. AllocPerc enters the
regression with a positive sign, but only during the first month of trading.
The laddering motive for hiding produces two other testable predictions. First, if
institutions that enter in a laddering agreement break it, it has to be the case that they
sell the shares that they bought through the lead underwriters. Hence, there should be
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a positive correlation between the volume bought through the lead underwriters and
the volume of “secondary” shares sold. Second, since laddering involves an agreement
between the lead underwriter and the institution, an institution that engages in lad-
dering is most likely a client of the lead underwriter. Hence, the lead underwriter is
going to detect any of its flipping activities thanks to detailed flipping reports. Flip-
ping trades signal to the lead underwriter that the institution sold more shares than it
bought in the aftermarket. Hence, flipping trades reveal to the lead underwriter that
the institution sold also “secondary” shares through other brokers, thus breaking the
laddering agreement, if any. Therefore, institutions that buys through the lead under-
writers and wants to hide their “secondary” sales should avoid allocation sales, thus
generating a negative correlation between flipping and buying through the lead under-
writers. If these correlations are driven by hiding incentives related to laddering, then
they should hold only for institutions that received IPO allocations and trade during
the first month after the issue.
In order to test these predictions, we regress the amount of net buy through the
lead underwriters on the other trading volume components:
BLi,j − SLi,j
Ni
= θ0 + θ1
STi,j − F Ti,j
Ni
+ θ2
F Ti,j
Ni
+ θ3
BNLi,j
Ni
+Xi,jΓ + κj + ηi + εi,j
where Xi,j is a vector of control variables (which includes NormalTradeLeadi,j and
AllocPerci,j), κj and ηi are institution and firm fixed effects, and εi,j is the error term,
which we allow to be correlated within institution. The laddering motive for hiding
predicts θ1 > 0 and θ2 < 0 for institutions that received allocations and trade during
the first month after the issue. We use net buy, (BLi,j − SLi,j)/Ni, instead of total buy,
BLi,j/Ni, as dependent variable in order to prevent a mechanical correlation between
BLi,j/Ni and (S
T
i,j − F Ti,j)/Ni to arise when we control for BNLi,j /Ni in the regression.
Table 6 reports the OLS results. All ratios are multiplied by 100, thus being expressed
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as percentages. We use institution-clustered standard errors for inference.19
In columns (1)–(4), we perform the regression on first-month trading data, includ-
ing in the sample institutions that received some allocations (i.e., institutions with
AllocPerci,j > 0). Overall, results are consistent with the laddering motive for hiding.
The coefficient θ1 (θ2) is positive (negative) and statistically significant at the 1% level
in all specifications. Column (4) reports that selling an additional “secondary” share-
per-shares-issued is associated with an increase in the net buying through the lead
underwriters of 0.33 shares-per-share-issued; flipping an additional share-per-shares-
issued is associated with a decrease in the net buying through the lead underwriters of
0.4 shares-per-share-issued.
We perform placebo analyses running the regression on institutions with no alloca-
tions (column (5)) and institutions that trade during the third month after the issue
(column (6)). Consistent with the correlations in columns (1)-(4) being driven by lad-
dering hiding motives, the coefficients θ1 and θ2 are either insignificant or enter the
placebo regressions with the opposite sign.
The remaining volume component, that is the relative amount of shares bought
through brokers other than the lead underwriters (BuyNonLead or BNLi,j /Ni), is posi-
tively correlated with the net buy through the lead underwriters in month 3. Intuitively,
it makes sense: institutions that buy a stock, buy it through any broker they trade
with. Noticeably, this positive correlation disappears in specifications (1)-(4): when
laddering and hiding incentives are at place, buying through lead underwriters is not
anymore correlated with buying through non-lead brokers. Intriguingly, lead under-
writers’ usual clients have a significantly lower net buy through the lead underwriters:
NormalTradeLead enters the regression with a negative sign. Instead, the coefficient
19In unreported analyses, we allow the error term to be correlated within IPO, clustering standard
errors at the firm level. Results are consistent.
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of AllocPerc is positive and statistically significant in month 1, while being insignificant
in month 3. This is broadly consistent with laddering practices (Griffin et al. (2007)):
institutions with higher allocations tend to buy more shares through the lead under-
writers in the IPO aftermarket. However, an alternative interpretation could be that
institutions receive rationed IPO allocations and buy more shares in the aftermarket to
reach their optimal holdings. Since we do not observe institutions’ bidding behavior,
we cannot draw conclusions about the interpretation of the positive correlation between
net buy and IPO allocations.
Overall, our evidence suggests that, contrary to the conventional view, allocation
sales does not seem to be an important motive for hiding sell trades from the lead
underwriters. Instead, we find evidence consistent with the laddering explanation being
a relevant driver of institutional hiding behavior.
5. Alternative explanations and endogeneity issues
5.1. Buy/Sell asymmetry: selling more through brokers other than lead underwriters
versus buying more through lead underwriters?
The results of Tables 3 and 4 may be driven by investors buying through the lead
underwriters and not necessarily by investors selling through other brokers. If insti-
tutions showcase their buy trades to the lead underwriters when entering a laddering
agreement, then the coefficient of the regression of LeadDummy on Sell may be down-
ward biased in favor of our hide-and-sell hypothesis. Consequently, the coefficient of
the variable AllocationSalesDummy in the regression of LeadDummy on Sell and
AllocationSalesDummy may be upward biased in favor of the laddering incentive as
opposed to the flipping incentive to hide. To address this concern, we perform an alter-
native empirical strategy and look at how institutions’ trading behavior differ during the
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first month relative to the third month after an IPO. We run the following regressions,
conditional on institutions that receive IPO allocations:
BuyLead/TotBuyi,j,t = α0 + α1Month1t +Xi,j,tΓ1 + δi,j + εi,j,t
SecondarySalesLead/TotSelli,j,t = β0 + β1Month1t +Xi,j,tΓ2 + φi,j + εi,j,t
AllocationSalesLead/TotSelli,j,t = η0 + η1Month1t +Xi,j,tΓ3 + fi,j + ui,j,t
where BuyLead/TotBuyi,j,t is the percentage of IPO i shares bought by institution
j in month t through the lead underwriters of the IPO i in the total amount of shares
bought by the same institution j over month t; AllocationSales/TotSelli,j,t is the per-
centage of allocated shares sold by institution j in month t through the lead underwriters
of IPO i from the total amount of allocated shares sold, and SecondarySales/TotSelli,j,t
is the percentage of secondary sales of IPO i shares by institution j in month t through
the lead underwriters from total secondary sales of of IPO i.20 Month1t is a dummy
variable equal to one in month 1 and zero in month 3; Xi,j,t is a vector of control
variables, which include RelV oli,j,t and ExcLeadCommi,j,t; δi,j, φi,j, and fi,j capture
institution-firm fixed effects; and εi,j,t, εi,j,t, and ui,j,t are the error terms, which we allow
to be correlated within institution j. All ratios are expressed in percentage terms.
Table 7 reports the results. Columns (1) and (2) suggest that institutions tend
to showcase their buy trades to the lead underwriters in the IPO aftermarket. The
percentage of buy trades executed through the lead underwriters is about 17 percent-
age points greater in month 1 than in month 3. Columns (3) and (4) suggest that
institutions tend to hide their secondary sales from the lead underwriters in the IPO
20Since we can compute allocation sales at the daily level, there is some noise when we split an
institution’s flipping volume by broker type and such institution sells shares through both the lead
underwriters and other brokers on a given day. In such cases, we split flipping volume proportionally
to the total amount sold by broker type on that day.
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aftermarket, consistent with them hiding the breaking of their laddering agreements.
The percentage of secondary sales executed through the lead underwriters is about 5
percentage points smaller in month 1 than in month 3. Columns (5) and (6) suggest
that institutions do not hide their flipping activity, actually, tend to showcase them
to the lead underwriters in the IPO aftermarket. The percentage of allocation sales
executed through the lead underwriters is about 11 percentage points greater in month
1 than in month 3. Overall, these results are consistent with our baseline analyses of
sections 3 and 4.
5.2. Do lead underwriters charge higher commissions for sell trades?
An alternative explanation to our findings is the following. Underwriters might try
to disincentivize selling of IPO stocks by increasing brokerage commissions selectively
on sell trades. If this is the case, some investors might choose to sell through brokers
other than lead underwriters in order to save on commissions without any intention
to hide their trade. This would generate the buy/sell asymmetry in the choice of the
broker observed in our regressions even when the null hypothesis of no hiding behavior
holds, thus invalidating our conclusions. Broadly consistent with this argument, Ellis
(2006) finds evidence of bookrunners offering better terms on buy trades in a sample
of Nasdaq IPOs.
We show that this explanation is unlikely to drive our results. First, we con-
trol for the average commission required by lead underwriters in excess of the com-
mission required by other brokers (ExcLeadComm) in our regressions. The variable
ExcLeadComm is computed for buy trades and sell trades separately. Hence, it con-
trols for the effect of the potential differential treatment that lead underwriters give to
different trades on the investors’ probability of choosing a lead underwriter as a broker.
Second, we investigate the commissions story more deeply. If the commission story is a
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concern, then we should observe lead underwriters to require higher brokerage commis-
sions for sell trades relative to at least one of these benchmarks: i) lead underwriters’
commissions for buy trades in the IPO aftermarket; ii) lead underwriters’ commissions
for sell trades few months after the IPO; iii) commissions of brokers other than the lead
underwriters for sell trades in the IPO aftermarket. We find that Figure 3 and Table 8
show that Figure 3 plots the average trading commission paid to the lead underwriters
for buying trades (dark grey line) and sell trades (light grey line) by month from the
issue date. Commissions are scaled by the dollar volume traded and 95% confidence
intervals are reported with dotted lines. If anything, average brokerage commissions of
lead underwriters are higher for buy trades than for sell trades during the IPO after-
market. Moreover, average brokerage commissions for sell trades tend to be somewhat
higher several months after the IPO than during the first month after the issue date.
Table 8 reports difference of means tests for the percentage trading commissions paid
to lead underwriters and to any other broker during the first month after the IPO. The
table shows that sell trade commissions do not significantly differ among broker types.
They do differ, however, for buy trades: lead underwriters require higher commissions
for buy trades than other brokers do.
Hence, empirical evidence does not support the commissions story: lead underwrit-
ers do not increase commissions on sell trades to disincentivize selling of IPO stocks.
In fact, there is some evidence that they might be doing the opposite: commissions
on buy trades seem to be particularly high in the IPO aftermarket.21 If anything, this
21Understanding why lead underwriters’ commissions on buy trades are high in the IPO aftermarket
goes beyond the scope of this paper. Though difficult to reconcile with Ellis (2006)’s result, we notice
that our evidence is broadly consistent with the literature on quid-pro-quo agreements in IPOs, which
suggest that investors might get preferential treatment in the allocation of IPOs in exchange of paying
excessive brokerage commissions to the lead underwriters (e.g., Reuter (2006)). Our finding is also
broadly consistent with Griffin et al. (2007), who finds that there is more net buying through the
bookrunners in IPOs in which the bookrunner charges higher trading costs.
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could actually work against finding results in favor of the hide-and-sell hypothesis.
5.3. Adressing endogeneity concerns
The decision to sell is endogenous. Institutions that decide to sell an IPO stock
might differ from institutions that buy the IPO under several dimensions that might
be correlated with their choice of the broker. In an ideal experiment, we would like to
observe how institution j would have traded IPO i if, for a given trade, it would have
switched trade side. Since in one of our specifications we exploit within institution-IPO
variation, we rule out sources of endogeneity that are constant within institution-IPO
pairs (e.g., the relationship between an investor and the lead underwriters of an IPO):
we observe the same institution buying and selling the same IPO stock through different
brokers, often over the same trading day.22 Even though this might seem reasonably
close to the ideal experiment mentioned above, we cannot exclude that some trade-
varying unobserved factors jointly drive investors’ selling and broker choices within
institution-IPO pairs. However, it is hard to find a trade-level factor that would make
the buy/sell asymmetry in the choice of the broker vanish, given that we control for
commissions, volume, and day. Another source of potential criticism is related to the
fact that our estimation in column (5) of Table 3 exploits variation in the trading side
within institution-IPO pairs. In our sample, more than 50% of the observations do not
exhibit variation within institution-IPO; i.e., the investor is either buying or selling the
IPO stock. Hence, in column (5) we use information of a specific subsample of obser-
vations. This is unlikely to be a relevant issue for our purposes, as the specification of
column (5) still serves the goal of detecting hiding behavior. Moreover, the coefficient
of Sell in the regressions of Table 3 is fairly stable across different specifications, in-
22We observe an institution j trading the same stock i through several distinct brokers b during the
same trading day t for 23% of the observations.
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cluding column (5). Overall, even though we do not claim that we estimate a causal
effect, endogeneity concerns are unlikely to qualitatively change our conclusions about
the buy/sell asymmetry in the choice of the broker.
For robustness, we also seek for a source of exogenous variation in the selling deci-
sion of financial institutions. Funds in distress, which experience large outflows, tend
to decrease their existing positions (Coval and Stafford (2007)), including their IPO
holdings. Hence, institutions that manage funds in distress are more likely to sell IPO
shares. This suggests a candidate instrument for financial institutions’ selling deci-
sions: the number of funds in distress managed by the institution. This instrument
is plausibly exogenous in this setting, as funds’ distress is likely unrelated with the
probability of the institution trading through the lead underwriters of a given IPO.23
Moreover, underwriters usually allocate shares to fund families, which then decide how
to distribute them within the family (Ritter and Zhang (2007)). This lowers the scope
for direct links between distressed funds and the institution’s choice to trade through
the underwriters in the IPO aftermarket.
We use clientcode-clientmgrcode pairs in the Abel Noser Solutions’ database to
identify distinct funds managed by our sample institutions.24 We define a fund to be
in distress in a given month if two conditions are met: 1) more than 99% of its trading
23A theoretically possible channel that could invalidate the exogeneity assumption is that institu-
tions with several funds in distress might be institutions with little or no connections with important
brokers, which also underwrite IPOs. Under this “connection” argument, institutions with distressed
funds would tend to trade more with non-lead brokers regardless of the side of the trade. We find
no evidence in this direction: the number of distressed funds of an institution is not significantly cor-
related with its normal number of trades executed through the lead underwriters in non-IPO stocks
(NormalTradeLead).
24From our talks with ANcerno it became clear that clientmgrcode identifies individual funds, fund
managers, or separately managed accounts (see also Hu et al. (2018)). Clientmgrcode is provided
by the client and may change over time, ANcerno however reassured us that clientmgrcode remains
unchaged within each a batch of data provided by the client (identified by the lognumber). For this
reason, we follow Eisele et al. (2017) and use a couple clientcode-clientmgrcode to separate among
individual funds.
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volume in non-IPO stocks is due to sell trades; 2) the monthly dollar volume traded
by the fund in non-IPO stoks is above the 90th percentile. The idea is that funds
with large selling volumes are likely experiencing a fire-sale event. Our institution-level
distress variable, LnDistressFundsi,j, is the natural logarithm of the number of funds
in distress managed by institution j during the month in which the IPO i is made. We
use it as instrumental variable for Sell. Table 9 reports the 2SLS results, which are
qualitatively consistent with our baseline regressions.
The results of Table 9 have to be taken cautiously. We acknowledge that they are
sensitive to the choice of the dollar volume threshold: the instrument becomes weak
when we set lower thresholds, such as the 50th or the 75th percentiles of the monthly
volume traded. Even though it make sense that only large transaction volumes are
related to fire-sales events that could be relevant in the first stage regression, we cannot
justify the choice of a specific volume threshold to build our variable. Table 9 suggests
that endogeneity concerns do not seem to qualitatively change our conclusions, but
the potential weakness of the instrument does not allow us to make strong causal
statements.
6. Is the hiding strategy effective?
In this section we test whether selling through non-lead brokers allow institutional
clients to be less penalized in future IPO allocations from the lead underwriter. Ac-
cording to Chemmanur et al. (2010), institutions that flip their shares receive fewer al-
locations in subsequent IPOs. We develop our predictions following their findings, and
investigate whether institutions that employ the hiding strategy and sell their shares
through non-lead brokers, manage to circumvent underwriters’ penalty in terms of share
allocations. It is important to assess if the hiding strategy is indeed: 1) beneficial for
the institution; 2) costly for the IPO process, as allocations might be suboptimal. To
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test our predictions, we estimate Arellano-Bond regressions with difference-GMM of
IPO allocations on the selling transactions executed by institutions lead underwriters
and non-lead brokers using the following model:
AvgPercAllocj,t = β0 + β1AvgSecondarySalesLeadj,t−1
+ β2SecondarySalesNonLeadj,t−1 + [...] +Xj,t−1Γ + δj + τt + εj,t
where AvgAllocPerc is the average percentage IPO allocation received by the in-
stitution in a 6-months period as a portion of total shares offered in an IPO. Our
variables of interest are L.AvgSecondarySalesLead (L.AvgSecondarySalesNonLead)
that is lagged 6-months average relative share volume of secondary sales executed
through lead brokers (non-lead brokers). Other variables included in the model are
the average lagged 6-month trading volume components scaled by the number of shares
issued: L.AvgBuyLead (L.AvgBuyNonLead ) is the average relative number of shares
bought through the lead underwriters (non-lead brokers); L.AvgAllocationSalesLead
(L.AvgAllocationSalesNonLead) is the relative number of allocated shares sold through
lead brokers (non-lead brokers). Xj,t−1 is a vector of control variables: NormalTradeLeadj,t−1
and the lagged AvgAllocPerc. δj are institution fixed effects, τt are semi-annual fixed
effects, and εi,t is the error term, which we allow to be correlated within institution.
Table 9 reports the results on the regression analysis of IPO allocations received by
institutions in our sample. All ratios are multiplied by 100. The results confirm that
institutions selling IPO shares through lead underwriters receive fewer allocations (as
a fraction of the number of shares issued). According to Column (4), the coefficient
on L.AvgSecondarySalesLead is negative and significant. A one unit increase in the
volume of secondary shares sold through lead underwriters is associated with a 6.42
percentage points decrease in the proportion of allocated shares to the institution in
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the following 6-month period. The coefficient on L.AvgSecondarySalesNonLead is
insignificant, confirming the hypothesis that institutions hiding their sells with non-
lead brokers are unlikely to be penalized for their selling.
In Column (2) we control for NormalTradeLead - the % volume of sell or buy
trades in non-IPO stocks made by the institution through the lead underwriters in a
6-month period prior to the issues. Columns (3) and (4) include semi-annual fixed
effects. Columns (1)-(3) use one-lag instruments, Column (4) includes one-lag and
two-lag instruments. The results are qualitatively similar in all specifications.
Overall, our findings support the idea that the choice of the broker for selling IPO
shares can be an effective way to bypass the underwriters’ attention and avoid the
penalty in terms of future allocations. Selling IPO shares in the amount that does
not exceed the amount of shares bought by the institution in the aftermarket allows
institutions to avoid a penalty in terms of share allocation that a lead underwriter
may impose on institutions otherwise. The incentives to punish and hide selling trades
seem to be present only for secondary sales, they do not seem to be pronounced for
allocations sales.
7. Conclusion
We document that institutional investors are less likely to sell than buy through lead
underwriters in the aftermarket of IPOs issued between 1999 and 2010 in the United
States. The probability of trading through a lead underwriter during the first month
after the issue is about 6 percentage points less for sell trades than for buy trades.
This result holds when controlling for important determinants of the choice to trade
with a lead underwriter, such as the relationship between the institution and the lead
underwriters, and is robust to institution, IPO, and institution-IPO fixed effects. We
find that the documented buy/sell asymmetry varies consistently with hiding incentives:
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it is stronger when the aftermarket demand for IPO stocks is weaker (i.e., in cold IPOs),
it does not hold after the first month of trading, and it does not hold for a matched
sample of non-IPO stocks.
We rule out potential alternative explanations for the buy/sell asymmetry. Our
findings are not driven by underwriters’ strategically setting differential brokerage com-
missions to disincetivize sell trades. Moreover, our evidence suggests that the buy/sell
asymmetry is not only driven by investors buying more through the lead underwrit-
ers, but also by investors selling less through the lead underwriters. Finally, potential
endogeneity concerns are unlikely to make the buy/sell asymmetry vanish and we find
evidence consistent with this view in an IV setting, using a proxy for institutional
fire-sales as exogenous shock for the decision to sell an IPO.
We investigate the motives behind institutional investors’ hiding behavior. Contrary
to the conventional view, we find that flipping IPO allocations is not an important
motive for hiding sell trades from the lead underwriters. This is reasonable, as under-
writers have access to reports that document investors’ flipping activity. We propose
and test a novel explanation of the buy/sell asymmetry in the choice of the broker in
IPO aftermarket. We find evidence in favor of this explanation. Institutional investors
that agree with the underwriters to buy additional shares in the IPO aftermarket in
exchange of receiving allocations (a practice known as “laddering”), might break this
agreement by hiding-and-selling the shares bought in the aftermarket through other
brokers. Consistent with the laddering explanation, we find that: i) the percentage
of sell volume executed through non-lead brokers is higher when institutional investors
buy more shares through the lead underwriters in the IPO aftermarket and when in-
stitutional investors execute more “secondary” sales (i.e., sales other than allocation
sales); and ii) the volume of “secondary” shares sold in the aftermarket by an insti-
tution is positively correlated with its net buy volume through the lead underwriters.
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Moreover, an investor that hide his/her sell trades because of the laddering agreement
should avoid flipping trades. These trades signal to the lead underwriters that the
investor sold more shares than it bought in the aftermarket, thus revealing that it has
broken the laddering agreement. Consistently, we find a negative correlation between
the allocation sales volume of an institution and its net buy volume through the lead
underwriters.
We show that hiding sell trades is an effective strategy to circumvent underwriters’
monitoring mechanisms: the more institutions hide their sell trades, the less they are
penalized in subsequent IPO allocations.
Our evidence sheds light on how hiding incentives affect institutions’ choice of their
broker in the IPO aftermarket and stimulates further research to investigate how the
incentives of IPO investors may influence the IPO allocation process.
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Fig. 1. Average lead UW market share for different levels of underpricing. This figure shows the
average brokerage market share for buy trades (dark grey lines) and sell trades (light grey lines)
of the lead underwriters by month from the IPO date. For each IPO, we compute the percentage
of institutional buy and sell trades executed by the lead underwriters in each month from the IPO
date; then we average these percentages across IPO and we compute 95% confidence intervals of
the means (dashed lines). Panels (A) reports the brokerage market share for all IPOs. Panel (B)
reports the brokerage market share for hot IPOs (highest tercile of Underpricing); Panels (C)
reports the brokerage market shares for weak IPOs (middle tercile of Underpricing); and Panels
(D) reports the brokerage market share for cold IPOs (lowest tercile of Underpricing).
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Fig. 2. Average cumulative netbuy and buy/sell volume in the first 21 trading days after IPO
issue date. For each IPO, we compute the total amount bought and sold in each day by institutions
that trade through the lead underwriters, through other syndicate members, and through brokers
that did not participate in the IPO syndicate. We also compute the cumulative netbuy of lead
managers’ clients, syndicate members’ clients, and other brokers’ clients in the first 21 trading
days after the IPO. We scale the volume traded by the number of shares issued and we average
it across IPOs. Bars show institutions’ daily volume bought and sold; lines plot institutions’
cumulative netbuy. Panel (A) averages buy and sell volumes and cumulative netbuy for all IPOs.
Panels (B)-(D) break the averages down for hot IPOs (highest tercile of Underpricing), weak
IPOs (middle tercile of Underpricing), and cold IPOs (lowest tercile of Underpricing).
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Fig. 3. Average trading commissions. This figure plots the average trading commission paid
to the lead underwriters for buying trades (dark grey line) and sell trades (light grey line) by
month from the issue date. Commissions are scaled by the dollar volume traded. 95% confidence
intervals are reported with dotted lines.
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Table 2
Summary statistics of IPO allocations by institution and by issuer.
This table provides IPO allocations summary statistics at the institution level (AllocPerc) and
issuer level (Number of Allocations; Total % Institutional Allocation). AllocPerc is the percentage
of IPO shares allocated to an institution (winsorized at the 95% level). The table reports summary
statistics for all IPOs and for subsamples of IPOs based on Underpricing terciles: hot IPOs
(highest tercile), weak IPOs (middle tercile), and cold IPOs (lowest tercile). For each variable,
the table reports its average (mean), its median (p50), and its standard deviation (sd).
mean p50 sd
AllocPerc (all IPOs) 1.89 0.54 3.05
AllocPerc (hot IPOs) 1.53 0.40 2.71
AllocPerc (weak IPOs) 1.98 0.67 3.02
AllocPerc (cold IPOs) 2.53 0.78 3.67
Number of Allocations (all IPOs) 22.7 21 14.4
Number of Allocations (hot IPOs) 30.6 30 13.9
Number of Allocations (weak IPOs) 23.7 22 13.6
Number of Allocations (cold IPOs) 13.6 12 10.1
Total % Institutional Allocation (all IPOs) 42.7 42.5 21.7
Total % Institutional Allocation (hot IPOs) 47.0 45.6 23.1
Total % Institutional Allocation (weak IPOs) 46.9 47.3 20.6
Total % Institutional Allocation (cold IPOs) 34.3 33.9 18.7
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Table 4
What drives the Buy/Sell asymmetry: allocation sales vs secondary sales?
This table reports the estimation results of several specifications of a linear probability model
in a sample of institutional trades in 1,361 IPO stocks issued between 1999 and 2010. The sample
includes 44,576 trades executed in the first 21 trading days after the issue date. The dependent
variable is a dummy equal to one if the broker executing the trade is any of the lead underwriters
of the IPO (LeadDummy). Column (1) reports the results of an OLS regression of LeadDummy
on a dummy variable equal to one if the institution is selling and zero otherwise (Sell) and a
dummy variable equal to one if the sell trade contains an allocation sale and zero otherwise
(AllocationSalesDummy). Column (2) introduces several control variables: RelV ol is the number
of shares traded by the institution scaled by the number of shares issued; NormalTradeLead is
the percentage volume of sell or buy trades in non-IPO stocks made by the institution through
the lead underwriters in a 6-month period prior to the issue; Day is the day in which the trade is
executed, relative to the issue date; ExcLeadComm is the average percentage commission to the
lead underwriters minus the average percentage commission to any other broker paid by sample
institutions for their buy or sell trades in the first 21 trading days after the issue date; AllocPerc
is the percentage IPO allocation received by the institution. Columns (3), (4), and (5) introduce
institution, firm, and institution-firm fixed effects. All non-dummy variables are winsorized at the
95% level. Standard errors are clustered at the institution level (t-statistics are in parentheses).
Significance levels are denoted as: * 0.1, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
Dependent Variable: LeadDummy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sell -0.15∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗ -0.087∗∗∗ -0.081∗∗∗ -0.076∗∗∗
(-5.40) (-5.65) (-4.47) (-3.84) (-3.62)
AllocationSaleDummy 0.12∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗
(5.71) (3.98) (3.94) (2.88) (2.76)
Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Institution fixed effects No No Yes Yes No
Firm fixed effects No No No Yes No
Institution-Firm fixed effects No No No No Yes
Adjusted R2 0.0093 0.051 0.15 0.26 0.45
Observations 44576 44576 44576 44576 44576
% Outside [0,1] 0 0.00070 0 0.080 0
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Table 5
The determinants of selling through brokers other than lead underwriters.
This table reports the estimates of an OLS regression of SellNonLead - the volume of sales
executed through brokers other than the lead underwriter as a percentage of total sales [SNLi,j /S
T
i,j ]
on the trading volume components scaled by the number of shares issued: BuyLead is the relative
number of shares bought through the lead underwriters [BLi,j/Ni]; SecondarySales is the relative
volume of sales other than allocation sales [(STi,j−FTi,j)/Ni]; AllocationSales is the relative number
of shares flipped [FTi,j/Ni]; and BuyNonLead is the relative number of shares bought through non-
lead brokers [BNLi,j /Ni]. Control variables are described in Table 3. All ratios are multiplied by
100. Columns (1)-(4) include trades executed during the first month after the issue by institutions
that received an IPO allocation. Column (5) includes trades executed during the first month after
the issue by institutions with no IPO allocations. Column (6) includes trades executed during the
third month after the issue by institutions that received an IPO allocation. Standard errors are
clustered at the institution level (t-statistics are in parentheses). Significance levels are denoted
as: * 0.1, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
Dependent Variable: SellNonLead
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
No-allocations Month 3
BuyLead 1.12∗ 0.41 1.64∗∗∗ 1.24∗∗∗ -0.37 -2.24∗∗
(1.75) (0.58) (4.60) (3.50) (-0.23) (-2.08)
SecondarySales 1.74∗∗∗ 1.22∗ 3.11∗∗∗ 2.02∗∗∗ 0.92 -0.96
(2.77) (1.78) (3.29) (2.83) (0.42) (-1.01)
AllocationSales 0.23 -1.48∗ -0.14 -1.93∗∗∗ 0.41
(0.28) (-1.87) (-0.14) (-3.15) (0.45)
BuyNonLead 1.55∗∗∗ 1.18∗∗ 0.40 -0.045 1.56∗ 3.30∗∗∗
(2.71) (2.52) (0.80) (-0.11) (1.93) (4.96)
NormalTradeLead -3.81∗∗∗ -3.86∗∗∗ -4.43∗∗∗ -3.96∗∗∗ -2.17∗ -3.12∗∗∗
(-14.61) (-15.06) (-19.52) (-18.52) (-1.95) (-9.04)
AllocPerc 1.99∗∗∗ 1.41∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗ 0.24
(6.90) (4.37) (3.21) (1.15)
Constant 75.2∗∗∗ 73.9∗∗∗ 75.4∗∗∗ 62.2∗∗∗ 84.0∗∗ 78.7∗∗∗
(34.32) (33.25) (33.91) (16.55) (2.60) (11.63)
Institution fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.20 0.20 0.32 0.41 0.33 0.34
Observations 8539 8539 8539 8539 479 2421
o9
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Table 6
The determinants of the net-buying volume through lead underwriters.
This table reports the estimates of an OLS regression of NetBuyLead - the net buy volume
through the lead underwriters scaled by the number of shares issued [(BLi,j − SLi,j)/Ni] on other
trading volume components scaled by the number of shares issued: SecondarySales is the relative
volume of sales other than allocation sales [(STi,j−FTi,j)/Ni]; AllocationSales is the relative number
of shares flipped [FTi,j/Ni]; and BuyNonLead is the relative number of shares bought through non-
lead brokers [BNLi,j /Ni]. Control variables are described in Table 3. All ratios are multiplied by
100. Columns (1)-(4) include trades executed during the first month after the issue by institutions
that received an IPO allocation. Column (5) includes trades executed during the first month after
the issue by institutions with no IPO allocations. Column (6) includes trades executed during the
third month after the issue by institutions that received an IPO allocation. Standard errors are
clustered at the institution level (t-statistics are in parentheses). Significance levels are denoted
as: * 0.1, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
Dependent Variable: NetBuyLead
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
No-allocations Month 3
SecondarySales 0.31∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.20 -0.20∗∗∗
(8.43) (7.31) (5.97) (5.49) (0.67) (-3.04)
AllocationSales -0.30∗∗∗ -0.36∗∗∗ -0.36∗∗∗ -0.40∗∗∗ -0.018
(-6.81) (-6.80) (-9.45) (-8.25) (-0.30)
BuyNonLead 0.00013 -0.011 -0.023 -0.028 -0.028 0.44∗∗∗
(0.00) (-0.34) (-0.59) (-0.68) (-0.21) (9.48)
NormalTradeLead -0.0051∗ -0.0071∗∗∗ -0.0082∗∗∗ -0.0068∗∗∗ 0.059 -0.0075∗∗∗
(-1.73) (-2.77) (-3.26) (-2.75) (0.41) (-4.34)
AllocPerc 0.066∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.012
(4.86) (5.67) (5.23) (0.89)
Constant 0.073∗∗∗ 0.029∗ 0.029∗∗ 0.072 1.16 -0.088
(2.80) (1.74) (2.27) (1.39) (0.88) (-1.07)
Institution fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.14 0.15 0.24 0.23 0.31 0.17
Observations 8539 8539 8539 8539 479 2421
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Table 7
Abnormal buying through Lead-UW versus abnormal selling through other brokers.
This table reports the estimates of OLS regressions of three dependent variables:
(1)BuyLead/TotBuyi,j,t - the percentage of IPO i shares bought by institution j in month t
through the lead underwriters of the IPO i in the total amount of shares bought by the same
institution j over month t; (2)SecondarySalesLead/TotSelli,j,t - the percentage of secondary
sales of IPO i shares by institution j in month t through the lead underwriters of IPO i; and
(3)AllocationSalesLead/TotSelli,j,t - the percentage of allocated shares sold by institution j in
month t through the lead underwriters of IPO i from the total amount of allocated shares sold, on
the variable Month1t, which is a dummy variable equal to one in month 1 and zero in month 3.
We include the following control variables: RelV ol is the number of shares traded by the institu-
tion scaled by the number of shares issued; ExcLeadComm is the average percentage commission
to the lead underwriter minus the average percentage commission to any other broker paid by
institutions for their buy trades (Column (1)-(2)) or sell trades (Column (3)-(4)) over a month t.
We include institution-firm fixed effects in all specifications. All ratios are expressed in percent-
age terms. Standard errors are clustered at the institution level (t-statistics are in parentheses).
Significance levels are denoted as: * 0.1, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
Dependent Variable: BuyLead/TotBuy SecondarySalesLead/TotSell AllocationSalesLead/TotSell
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Month1 18.2∗∗∗ 17.3∗∗∗ -5.41∗∗ -5.30∗∗ 12.4∗∗∗ 11.0∗∗∗
(7.21) (7.16) (-2.38) (-2.12) (7.14) (5.44)
RelVol 0.70 2.38∗∗∗ 2.87∗∗
(1.33) (3.92) (2.56)
ExcLeadComm 33.6 40.5 76.3∗∗
(1.55) (1.28) (2.43)
Constant 20.3∗∗∗ 19.6∗∗∗ 20.4∗∗∗ 18.4∗∗∗ 22.7∗∗∗ 21.7∗∗∗
(12.74) (10.70) (19.40) (14.81) (15.33) (13.76)
Inst-Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.48 0.48 0.28 0.29 0.50 0.51
Observations 6710 6710 2561 2561 9180 9180
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Table 8
Commissions by broker type and side of the trade.
This table reports difference of means tests for the percentage trading commission paid to lead
underwriters and to any other broker by financial institutions in IPOs issued between 1999 and
2010. The sample includes 20,107 sell trades and 24,469 buy trades executed during the first month
after the issue date. The percentage trading commission paid by an institution to the broker is
winsorized at the 95% level. Standard errors are corrected for unequal variances (t-statistics are
in parentheses). Significance levels are denoted as: * 0.1, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
All others Lead UWs Diff. of means
% sell commissions 0.0886 0.0895 -0.000869
(-0.472)
% buy commissions 0.109 0.122 -0.0124∗∗∗
(-6.814)
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Table 9
IV regression with distressed funds.
This table reports the estimation results of several specification of a 2SLS regression in a sample
of institutional trades in 1,361 IPO stocks issued between 1999 and 2010. The dependent variable
is a dummy equal to one if the broker executing the trade is any of the lead underwriters of the
IPO (LeadDummy). The sample includes 44,576 trades executed in the first 21 trading days after
the issue date. Panel (A) reports the first stage results; Panel (B) reports the second stage results.
Column (1) reports the results of a 2SLS regression of LeadDummy on a dummy variable equal
to one if the institution is selling and zero otherwise (Sell), instrumented by LnDistressFunds.
LnDistressFunds is the natural logarithm of the number of funds managed by the institution
that are in distress. A fund is defined to be in distress if: 1) its total volume traded in all stocks in
the IPO month is more than 25 million dollars and 2) its total dollar netbuy in all stocks divided
by the total volume traded is less than -0.99. Column (2) introduces several control variables:
RelV ol is the number of shares traded by the institution scaled by the number of shares issued;
NormalTradeLead is the percentage volume of sell or buy trades in non-IPO stocks made by the
institution through the lead underwriters in a 6-month period prior to the issue; Day is the day in
which the trade is executed, relative to the issue date; ExcLeadComm is the average percentage
commission to the lead underwriters minus the average percentage commission to any other broker
paid by sample institutions for their buy or sell trades in the first 21 trading days after the issue
date; AllocPerc is the percentage IPO allocation received by the institution. Columns (3) and
(4) introduce institution and firm fixed effects. All non-dummy variables are winsorized at the
95% level. Standard errors are clustered at the institution level (t-statistics are in parentheses).
Significance levels are denoted as: * 0.1, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
(a) First stage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LnDistressFunds 0.11∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
(3.17) (3.98) (8.02) (4.22)
Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Institution fixed effects No No Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects No No No Yes
F-stat 10.0 70.3 96.4 .
Adjusted R2 0.0058 0.067 0.18 0.31
Observations 44576 44576 44576 44576
(b) Second stage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sell -1.32∗∗∗ -1.12∗∗∗ -0.56∗∗∗ -1.35∗
(-3.92) (-5.26) (-3.02) (-1.65)
Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Institution fixed effects No No Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects No No No Yes
Observations 44576 44576 44576 44576
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Table 10
Is the hiding strategy effective?
This table reports the estimates of Arellano-Bond regressions estimated with difference-GMM.
The dependent variable, AvgAllocPerc, is the average percentage IPO allocation received by the
institution in a 6-months period. The regressors are the average lagged 6-month trading volume
components scaled by the number of shares issued: L.AvgBuyLead (L.AvgBuyNonLead ) is the
average relative number of shares bought through the lead underwriters (brokers other than lead
underwriters); L.AvgSecondarySalesLead (L.AvgSecondarySalesNonLead) is the average rela-
tive share volume of secondary sales through lead brokers (brokers other than lead underwriters);
L.AvgAllocationSalesLead (L.AvgAllocationSalesNonLead) is the relative number of allocated
shares sold through lead brokers (brokers other than lead underwriters). In Column (2) we con-
trol for NormalTradeLead - the % volume of sell or buy trades in non-IPO stocks made by the
institution through the lead underwriters in a 6-month period prior to the issues. All ratios are
multiplied by 100. Columns (3) and (4) include semi-annual fixed effects. Columns (1)-(3) use
one-lag instruments, Column (4) includes one-lag and two-lag instruments. Standard errors are
clustered at the institution level (t-statistics are in parentheses). Significance levels are denoted
as: * 0.1, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
Dependent Variable: AvgAllocPerc
(1) (2) (3) (4)
L.AvgSecondarySalesLead -6.69∗∗∗ -6.48∗∗∗ -6.42∗∗∗ -4.53∗∗∗
(-3.12) (-2.90) (-2.82) (-3.25)
L.AvgSecondarySalesNonLead -0.38 -0.44 -0.44 -0.24
(-1.03) (-1.14) (-1.12) (-0.59)
L.AvgAllocationSalesLead 0.76 0.68 0.70 0.84
(1.31) (1.11) (1.12) (1.60)
L.AvgAllocationsSalesNonLead 0.12 0.12 0.11 -0.11
(0.79) (0.78) (0.71) (-0.58)
L.AvgBuyLead 0.23 0.21 0.21 0.13
(1.43) (1.31) (1.32) (0.90)
L.AvgBuyNonLead 0.35∗∗ 0.34∗∗ 0.34∗∗ 0.14
(2.56) (2.47) (2.44) (1.11)
L.AvgPercAlloc 0.020 0.017 0.019 0.089
(0.19) (0.16) (0.17) (0.78)
NormalTradeLead 0.00075 0.00079 0.00099∗∗
(1.46) (1.55) (2.31)
Institution fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects No No Yes Yes
N. instrument lags 1 1 1 2
AR(2) (p-value) 0.55 0.62 0.58 0.19
Hansen overid. test (p-value) . . . 0.079
Observations 3696 3696 3696 3696
57
Appendices
A. Ancerno Data Description
This data appendix provides a detailed description of ANcerno data inspired by years
of exchanges with the data provider, as well as the explanation of the mapping procedure
we use to produce the dataset. Our sample consists of institutional transaction-level
trading data from ANcerno/Abel Noser Solutions. ANcerno clients (money managers,
pension plan sponsors, and brokers) provide their trading data to ANcerno to monitor
their transaction costs. Each client has a unique numerical identifier in the dataset
(clientcode) that allows distinguishing among the three types of clients. Nevertheless,
the identity of the client is anonymized. We use clientcode mainly as a technical variable
in several matching exercises we perform. One of the main variables of interest to us is
managercode by ANcerno attributed to the trading institutions. After receiving data
from their clients, ANcerno assigns a code to each manager within the client’s portfolio.
Because several clients may use the same manager, in order to associate a manager with
a particular client, ANcerno codes the manager in relation to a client. Another reason
they do this is because different clients may report the same managers differently (e.g.,
different spelling). By coding the manager in relation to a customer, ANcerno can trace
back the manager to a particular client. Managers can be grouped across clients by
using the managercode. ANcerno uses the same logic in mapping executing brokers in
the data. The main ANcerno trading dataset includes clientcode, clientmgrcode and
clientbkrcode we use in our matching process.
ANcerno data is subscription specific. For a limited period of time in 2010, ANcerno
provided its academic subscribers with the identification table “MasterManagerXref”
that includes managercodes with the associated names of trading institutions. The file
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we got includes 1088 unique institutions. Additional identification files “ManagerXref”
and “BrokerXref” include clientcode, clientmgrcode, and clientbkrcode variables allowing
to link fund families and brokers to the trading data in the main ANcerno dataset. The
mapping procedure we use is shown in detail in Figure A1. Figure A1 shows the two-
step matching we use to get the managing company name on the main ANcerno trading
dataset. In the first step, we merge “ManagerXref” file on the main ANcerno table using
clientcode-clientmgrcode as a key identifier. We further link the resulting table with
the managing company name (variable manager) from the “MasterManagerXref” file
on provided (managercodes).
We use the S12type5 Table provided by Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS)
to map management companies from SEC 13F filings to mutual funds reporting their
holdings in the Thomson Reuters S12 Mutual fund holdings database. S12 data con-
tains funds associated to fund families in 13F. Finally, we match ANcerno institutions
with the institutions from S12/13F Thomson Reuters database. We manually match
managing company names from both datasets: variable manager in ANcerno and mgrco
in S12 database.
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Main ANcerno trades database 
clientcode (ANcerno’s unique client identifier) 
clientmgrcode (as reported by the client) 
clientbkrcode  (as reported by the client) 
MasterManagerXref file from ANcerno 
managercode (unique asset manager 
identifier by ANcerno) 
manager (unique asset manager name) 
ManagerXref file from ANcerno 
clientcode 
clientmgrcode 
managercode  
reportedmanager (asset manager name as 
reported by the client) 
 on managercode 
BrokerXref file from ANcerno 
clientcode 
clientbkrcode  
broker (unique broker identifier in ANcerno) 
brokername  
 
Thomson Reuters 13F filings 
mgrcocd (asset manager numerical identifier) 
mgrco (asset manager name) 
manager  and 
mgrco hand-
matched 
Thomson Financial Security Data Company 
(SDC) 
IPO underwriters’ (brokers’) names 
broker names 
hand-matched 
Fig. A1. Mapping money managers and brokers across databases (key identifier(s) for the match
are provided in bold).
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B. Allocation Sales
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95% conf. intervals
Fig. B2. Allocation sales by IPO type. This figure plots the average cumulative percentage of
allocated IPO shares sold, scaled by the number of shares offered, by month from the issue date.
95% confidence intervals are reported with dotted lines. The black line report the average for
the whole sample of IPOs. The grey lines break the averages down for hot IPOs (highest tercile
of Underpricing), weak IPOs (middle tercile of Underpricing), and cold IPOs (lowest tercile of
Underpricing).
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C. Further Robustness Tests
We use a linear probability model (LPM) in our baseline regressions and we estimate
its coefficients via OLS. We justify the use of OLS because the unconditional probability
of trading with the lead underwriters is not at the boundaries of the unit interval (it is
0.292). Moreover, a very small proportion of the predicted probabilities of trading with
the lead underwriters fall outside the [0, 1] interval and only one specification out of
five suffers of this problem (see Table 3). Horrace and Oaxaca (2006) show that OLS is
unbiased and consistent if all the observations have true predicted probabilities within
the unit interval. We cannot know the true predicted probabilities, but our predicted
probabilites do not raise suspect that potential OLS biasedness and inconsistency are
relevant concerns in our setting. Finally, a LPM is desirable in our situation because
it allows us to control for fixed effects without incurring in the incidental parameter
problem and it estimates marginal effects. For robustness, we also run logit regressions
and get rid of the fixed effects by means of a conditional logit model. Table C1 reports
the estimation results, which are overall consistent with our baseline regressions.25
Almost 50% of the IPOs in our sample are issued during the internet bubble period.
We replicate our regression analysis excluding IPOs issued in 1999 and 2000 and report
our findings in Table C2. The results are similar to those of our baseline regressions.
We use LeadDummy as dependent variable in our baseline regressions. This implies
that we pool in the same group of brokers the other syndicate members and brokers
that do not belong to the underwriting syndicate. For robustness, we replicate our
regression analysis using UWDummy as dependent variable. UWDummy takes the
25We cannot estimate all the specifications because of computational problems with the conditional
logit model. In unreported analyses, we also run the LPM while trimming observations with predicted
probabilities outside the unit interval, as suggested by Horrace and Oaxaca (2006). If anything, our
results get stronger.
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value of 1 if the trade is executed through any of the underwriters of the IPO and
zero otherwise. Table C3 shows that results are overall consistent with our baseline
regressions. If anything, they are slightly weaker, consistent with hiding incentives
being mainly related to lead underwriters.
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Table C1
Buy-Sell asymmetry: logit and conditional logit specifications.
This table reports the coefficient estimates of logit and conditional logit models in a sample of
institutional trades in 1,361 IPO stocks issued between 1999 and 2010. The dependent variable
is a dummy equal to one if the broker executing the trade is any of the lead underwriters of the
IPO (LeadDummy). The original sample includes 44,576 trades executed in the first 21 trading
days after the issue date. Column (1) reports the results of a logit regression of LeadDummy
on a dummy variable equal to one if the institution is selling and zero otherwise (Sell). Column
(2) introduces several control variables: RelV ol is the number of shares traded by the institution
scaled by the number of shares issued; NormalTradeLead is the percentage volume of sell or buy
trades in non-IPO stocks made by the institution through the lead underwriters in a 6-month
period prior to the issue; Day is the day in which the trade is executed, relative to the issue
date; ExcLeadComm is the average percentage commission to the lead underwriters minus the
average percentage commission to other brokers paid by sample institutions for their buy or sell
trades in the first 21 trading days after the issue date; AllocPerc is the percentage IPO allocation
received by the institution. Column (3) controls for institution-firm fixed effects by means of
a conditional logit model. All non-dummy variables are winsorized at the 95% level. Standard
errors are clustered at the institution level (t-statistics are in parentheses). Significance levels are
denoted as: * 0.1, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
Dependent Variable: LeadDummy
(1) (2) (3)
Sell -0.29∗∗ -0.40∗∗∗ -0.37∗∗
(-2.07) (-3.64) (-2.44)
RelVol 0.31∗∗ 1.04∗∗∗
(2.57) (7.60)
NormalTradeLead 0.041∗∗∗ 0.019
(4.92) (0.78)
Day -0.059∗∗∗ -0.069∗∗∗
(-6.09) (-5.07)
ExcLeadComm -0.87 -1.56∗
(-1.15) (-1.79)
AllocPerc -0.0011
(-0.05)
Constant -0.76∗∗∗ -0.62∗∗∗
(-5.12) (-4.08)
Institution-Firm fixed effects No No Yes
Pseudo R2 0.0036 0.041 0.078
Observations 44576 44576 21693
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Table C2
Dropping 1999-2000 period.
This table reports the estimation results of several specification of a linear probability model in
a sample of institutional trades in 698 IPO stocks issued between 2001 and 2010. The dependent
variable is a dummy equal to one if the broker executing the trade is any of the lead underwriters
of the IPO (LeadDummy). The sample includes 24,109 trades executed in the first 21 trading
days after the issue date. Column (1) reports the results of an OLS regression of LeadDummy
on a dummy variable equal to one if the institution is selling and zero otherwise (Sell). Column
(2) introduces several control variables: RelV ol is the number of shares traded by the institution
scaled by the number of shares issued; NormalTradeLead is the percentage volume of sell or buy
trades in non-IPO stocks made by the institution through the lead underwriters in a 6-month
period prior to the issue; Day is the day in which the trade is executed, relative to the issue date;
ExcLeadComm is the average percentage commission to the lead underwriters minus the average
percentage commission to other brokers paid by sample institutions for their buy or sell trades in
the first 21 trading days after the issue date; AllocPerc is the percentage IPO allocation received
by the institution. Columns (3), (4), and (5) introduce institution, firm, and institution-firm fixed
effects. All non-dummy variables are winsorized at the 95% level. Standard errors are clustered
at the institution level (t-statistics are in parentheses). Significance levels are denoted as: * 0.1,
** 0.05, *** 0.01.
Dependent Variable: LeadDummy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sell -0.052∗∗ -0.067∗∗∗ -0.060∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗∗ -0.050∗∗
(-2.27) (-3.48) (-3.78) (-3.43) (-2.34)
Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Institution fixed effects No No Yes Yes No
Firm fixed effects No No No Yes No
Institution-Firm fixed effects No No No No Yes
Adjusted R2 0.0032 0.063 0.15 0.24 0.40
Observations 24109 24109 24109 24109 24109
% Outside [0,1] 0 0.0016 0.00040 0.072 0
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Table C3
Including all underwriter syndicate members.
This table reports the estimation results of several specification of a linear probability model in
a sample of institutional trades in 1361 IPO stocks issued between 1999 and 2010. The dependent
variable is a dummy equal to one if the broker executing the trade is any of the underwriters
of the IPO (UWDummy). The sample includes 44,576 trades executed in the first 21 trading
days after the issue date. Column (1) reports the results of an OLS regression of UWDummy
on a dummy variable equal to one if the institution is selling and zero otherwise (Sell). Column
(2) introduces several control variables: RelV ol is the number of shares traded by the institution
scaled by the number of shares issued; NormalTradeUW is the percentage volume of sell or
buy trades in non-IPO stocks made by the institution through the underwriters in a 6-month
period prior to the issue; Day is the day in which the trade is executed, relative to the issue
date; ExcUWComm is the average percentage commission to the underwriters minus the average
percentage commission to other brokers paid by sample institutions for their buy or sell trades in
the first 21 trading days after the issue date; AllocPerc is the percentage IPO allocation received
by the institution. Columns (3), (4), and (5) introduce institution, firm, and institution-firm fixed
effects. All non-dummy variables are winsorized at the 95% level. Standard errors are clustered
at the institution level (t-statistics are in parentheses). Significance levels are denoted as: * 0.1,
** 0.05, *** 0.01.
Dependent Variable: UWDummy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sell -0.066∗∗ -0.080∗∗∗ -0.051∗∗∗ -0.049∗∗ -0.044∗
(-2.07) (-3.33) (-2.90) (-2.59) (-1.85)
Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Institution fixed effects No No Yes Yes No
Firm fixed effects No No No Yes No
Institution-Firm fixed effects No No No No Yes
Adjusted R2 0.0047 0.053 0.14 0.25 0.42
Observations 44576 44576 44576 44576 44576
% Outside [0,1] 0 0 0 0.042 0
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